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Highlights
• The euro is and will remain a stateless currency. Treaty
revisions and failed referendums have buried the idea that
it is a stepping stone towards European political union. This
has consequences for the euro’s governance structure.
• The complex governance structure of the euro area was
developed on the assumption that prevention would make
crisis management provisions unnecessary. This
assumption is now being  tested.
• The experience of the crisis shows that the euro-area
governance system lacks some crucial properties: speed of
reaction, policy discretion and centralised decision-making.
These shortcomings have damaged the euro’s international
status because a question mark has been raised over its
effectiveness as a stormy-weather currency.
• The euro has proved attractive as a fair-weather currency
for countries and investors well beyond its borders. But it
still remains to be seen if its governance is strong enough
for it to succeed as a stormy-weather currency.
Prepared for the Bruegel/Peterson Institute volume The euro at
10: the next global currency?, edited by Jean Pisani-Ferry and
Adam Posen, forthcoming April 2009
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The euro has been, is and will remain a currency without a
state. Ten or even five years ago many in Europe would have
questioned this assertion, because they saw the single cur-
rency as a stepping stone towards political union. A few
treaty revisions and failed referendums later, however, this
perspective has vanished. Even if the Treaty of Lisbon, which
includes most of the provisions of the aborted constitutional
treaty, is eventually ratified, the momentum has been lost.
For all practical purposes the euro must be regarded as an
orphan currency. 
The governance structure that results from this situation is a
complex one. The choices made at the time of the Maastricht
Treaty – a monetary union without a significant federal
budget, limited coordination of budgetary and structural poli-
cies, no integrated financial supervision, no strong political
counterpart to the central bank – were regarded by many of
its architects as temporary. Over time, it was hoped, a more
federal governance structure would emerge. The main play-
ers in the negotiation, Germany and France, did not have the
same views on what this structure would be, but they shared
the same dream: both expected the euro to accelerate
integration.  
Reforms of limited ambition are still possible and desirable
but on the whole the euro is bound to live with this
governance structure in the years to come. This does not
mean that it is doomed to fail. In fact it has thrived in its first
ten years of existence. The euro has provided price stability
to previously inflation-prone countries. It has offered a shel-
ter against currency crises. It has by and large been con-
ducive to budgetary discipline. It has attracted five new
members in addition to the eleven initial ones. And many
countries in Europe wish to adopt it .  
On the world scene, the euro has also been successful. Even
though research presented in this volume confirms that it
has not rivaled the dollar’s world currency status, it has cer-
tainly become a strong regional currency in Europe and the
Mediterranean region. Some countries in the region have de
factoadopted it, several peg to it, and many have become at
least partially ‘euroised’2.
The question we address in this paper is whether the
governance structure of the euro area is a handicap to fur-
ther gains in its international role and influence. Is the in-
complete character of European integration bound to be
perceived as a lingering weakness? Or is the rest of the world
likely to accept, and adapt to, the sui generischaracter of the
European currency?
This could have remained an abstract and unsolvable ques-
tion. In fact, while governance had long been a topic for dis-
cussion among European scholars and policymakers, the rest
of the world understandably paid limited attention to it. How-
ever, the advent of the crisis has put European governance to
an unexpectedly severe test. While the euro was introduced in
the midst of the ‘great moderation’ period and benefited from
it in the first eight-and-a-half years of its existence, the fol-
lowing 12 months were more agitated and the last six months
of its first decade were especially stormy. What this limited
experience has shown is that there is a sharp contrast be-
tween what can be expected from a governance system in
fair-weather conditions and in stormy-weather conditions. At
the time of writing (early 2009), several lessons from this ex-
perience can be drawn already. Many more will certainly
come.  
To address this question, we start in section one by briefly lay-
ing out our conceptual framework.  Section two is devoted to
assessing the euro area’s fair-weather record. Stormy-weather
governance is reviewed in section three. We draw lessons for
governance in section four and conclude in section five on the
implications for the international role of the euro.  
1. Accounts of the first ten years of the euro can be found in European Commission (2008) and Pisani-Ferry et al(2008).  
2. See especially György Szapary’s contribution to The Next Global Currency?(Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2009).2
1. Conceptual framework
Citizens generally do not expect their political leaders to ex-
hibit the same qualities when the country is in peace and
when it is at war. Similarly, one does not expect the same
from economic governance in normal and in crisis times.
In normal times key properties are stability, predictability
and incentive compatibility:
• After the damage of inflation and the stop-go policies of
the 1970s, the vast majority of countries in the world have
converged on policy regimes that give high priority to
macroeconomic stability. Clarity of objectives and trans-
parent matching between policy objectives and policy in-
struments, including by assigning price stability to an
independent central bank, have proved to be key tech-
niques in this respect.
• In a world of forward-looking expectations, the pre-
dictability of the policy course and of its responses to
shocks has become regarded as an essential property.
Policy rules that inform the public about the policymak-
ers’ reaction function have gained increasing support, ei-
ther in the primitive form of instrument rules or in more
sophisticated forms such as flexible inflation targeting.
• Finally, incentive properties are of major importance in a
system like the European one that relies heavily on de-
centralisation. With monetary policy centralised but budg-
etary and structural policies decided upon at national
level, it is important that actions taken at one level inte-
grate with those taken at another level in a way that is
consistent with the overall objective. Especially, a key
issue is whether or not actions taken centrally create in-
centives for stability-oriented actions by decentralised
players. For example, important questions are whether the
system is able to make budgetary policies consistent with
the overall goal of price stability and whether labour and
product market reforms introduced at national level are
conducive to swift adjustment in response to shocks.    
However, different properties are needed in crisis times.
Stability remains the objective in the medium term but, in the
short term, speed in countering the effects of the crisis is
rather the overriding goal. Instead of predictability, policy-
makers seek maximum discretion to address problems as
they emerge and freedom to adopt innovative, previously
untested solutions if needed. Finally, centralisation with a
view to ensuring swift implementation takes precedence over
incentives for good behaviour at decentralised level. Hence
the qualities that are expected from a policy system in crisis
times are clearly different from, and to some extent even
contradictory to, those expected from the same system in
normal times. 
A telling illustration of this tension is provided by fiscal and
monetary policy. In normal times the consensus view among
economists is that the two instruments should be managed
separately and that interaction between the two should be
minimised. But in crisis times there can be  a need for
considerable interaction between monetary and budgetary
policies.  
Criteria for assessing the performance of the euro area there-
fore need to be specific to the situation. Instead of analysing
performance in normal times and assuming that this record
is indicative of the performance across the entire distribu-
tion of probable events, we draw a sharp distinction between
the two types of situation and analyse performance
accordingly.   
2. The fair-weather record
The record of the euro area was extensively assessed on the
occasion of the tenth anniversary of the common European
currency (see especially European Commission, 2008 and
Pisani-Ferry et al, 2008, on which this section draws). 
It is widely agreed that the transition to the euro was re-
markably smooth and that, in spite of the disparity of the par-
ticipating countries’ previous inflation records, price stability
has on the whole been achieved. Figure 1, showing for the US
and the euro area the break-even measure of inflation ex-
pectations, indicates that they have remained low and stable
over the 2004-2008 period, including during the 2008 com-
modities-induced price hike.  This has been a major contri-
bution to macroeconomic stability. 
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Figure 1:
Inflation expectations in the US and the euro area
(three-month moving average of monthly break-even rates)
Source: BIS, Bruegel calculations3
3. On the basis of EU Commission forecasts released in January 2009. 
Though still positive, the record is less satisfactory for budg-
etary discipline. Overall, the euro area’s aggregate budget-
ary deficit was brought down from 2.3 percent of GDP in
1998 (the last year before the euro) to 0.6 percent in 2007,
and gross public debt as a percentage of GDP was reduced
by five percentage points. This was a better performance
than the US, where the deficit increased over the same pe-
riod and where the debt ratio remained roughly constant. But
there have been two shortcomings: first, in spite of the elab-
orate apparatus put in place to prevent and punish excessive
deficits, one country (Greece) still had a deficit above three
percent in 2007 and two (France and Portugal) were per-
ilously close to the threshold. To say the least, this indicates
the uneven effectiveness of the Stability Pact. Second, and
more importantly, the budgetary framework overlooked the
potential for quickly transforming private debt into public
debt through bail-outs of insolvent private institutions and
agents – and more generally through triggering sharp boom-
and-bust cycles that can make the budgetary situation look
artificially sound before it sharply deteriorates in a downturn.
Ireland and Spain were considered paragons of fiscal virtue at
end-2007, but the European Commission now forecasts their
debt ratios to deteriorate by 20 and 30 per-
centage points respectively by end-20093.
This suggests that the focus on national ac-
count data, the absence of stress testing and
the neglect of off-balance-sheet liabilities
have been significant weaknesses of the Eu-
ropean budgetary discipline framework.    
European surveillance was even less effective
in addressing non-budgetary sources of instability. Article 99
of the Treaty mandates the EU to monitor economic develop-
ments in member states and to ensure that they remain mu-
tually consistent. In part because Article 99’s provisions are
markedly weaker than those regarding excessive budgetary
deficits, and in part because of the misguided belief that
there is little macroeconomic instability to fear when mone-
tary policy is geared towards price stability and budgetary
policy towards the avoidance of excessive deficits, little ef-
fort was devoted to macroeconomic surveillance. The as-
sumption that by controlling budgetary deficits one is able
to control instability risk was already questioned in the afore-
mentioned 2008 Bruegel and Commission reports. In partic-
ular, it was noted that enduring price development
divergences could be observed within the euro area, possi-
bly resulting from real exchange rate misalignments (Figure
2). In other words the so-called ‘competitiveness channel’
was too slow and too weak to prevent boom-and-bust cycles
fuelled by excessively low real interest rates (which them-
selves resulted from above-average inflation). As the boom
ended Spain and Ireland, the two champions of the euro’s
first decade, plunged into deep and probably long recessions.
With the benefit of hindsight the obsession with budgetary
numerology and the failure of surveillance to
trigger appropriate policy responses can be
regarded as a major flaw in the policy system.
Even in the absence of a global crisis, they
would likely have resulted in significant ad-
justment difficulties. To undergo this adjust-
ment in the context of a worldwide recession
is a major challenge for the countries affected
and the euro area as a whole.   
In spite of the success of its currency, euro-area governance
has finally been disappointing in the field of external mone-
tary and financial relations. 
The relationship with immediate neighbours and potential
candidates for membership has been marred by controver-
sies about euro-area entry criteria. While several countries
in the region quickly adopted the euro as an external anchor
and/or became largely euro-ised, the attitude of the euro-
area authorities has been very guarded. The Commission, the
ECB and the Eurogroup insisted on sticking to the letter of the
entry criteria, defined at Maastricht and used in 1998 at the
time of the creation of the euro area, even though bench-
marking the inflation performance of a candidate country
against the three EU countries with the lowest inflation rate
amounted to ignoring the existence of the euro area and the
fact that the ECB had adopted a price stability definition.
There was a failure to adopt a criterion that preserved the
spirit of the treaty while being adaptable to changing
‘Euro-area governance
has been a
disappointment for
external monetary and
financial relations.’
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Figure 2: Real exchange rate and export divergences
within the euro area
Source: Bruegel calculations on the basis of Eurostat and DG ECFIN data.4
conditions, and this was widely interpreted as indicating a
reluctance to pursue a comprehensive enlargement. 
Relations with international partners developed positively as
a growing number of countries in the world recognised the
emergence of the euro as a major change in the international
landscape, but it has been made unduly complex by the frag-
mented nature of the area’s external representation. Table 1,
from Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008), gives an overview the exter-
nal representation of the euro area. Even in normal times,
such a degree of fragmentation and unevenness is bound to
be a source of ineffectiveness.   
3. Stormy-weather experience
The weather in the euro area, which had been mostly fair
since 1999, quickly became overcast and windy in the sum-
mer of 2007, when Europe suddenly faced a liquidity crisis
detonated by tensions in the US sub-prime mortgage market.
Remarkably, the ECB was the first central bank to react, with
an injection of €95 billion ($130 billion) on 9 August de-
signed to ensure orderly conditions in the euro money mar-
ket. Later the same day the Federal Reserve provided $24
billion of liquidity. The next day, the ECB and the Fed inter-
vened again to the tune of, respectively, €61 billion ($84 bil-
lion) and $38 billion, with other central banks around the
world injecting a total of roughly $20 billion.
During the next 13 months, the ECB continued to apply three
measures to alleviate tensions in the euro money market.
First, it continued to frontload the supply of liquidity over the
reserve maintenance periods. Second, the ECB maintained
the increased share of longer term refinancing operations in
its refinancing operations, which it had gradually built up
since the start of the crisis. Third, the ECB continued to con-
duct US dollar term auction facilities in cooperation with the
US Fed and other central banks, thereby providing US dollar
liquidity to euro area banks. Altogether these measures
proved that the European Central Bank was as capable as the
US Federal Reserve to contain the liquidity crisis, thus reas-
suring the euro area that its policy framework was robust to
stressful conditions.
Then, on 14 September 2008 another significantly more se-
vere shock came from the US: Lehman Brothers had gone
bankrupt. The same day, credit default swaps ratcheted up,
stock markets plummeted, central banks injected billions of
dollars into money markets, and Bank of America agreed to
buy Merrill Lynch. The liquidity situation deteriorated further
on both sides of the Atlantic and spreads between short-term
interbank interest rates and swap rates on government se-
curities reached unprecedented levels. Two days later, AIG
Corp, the world's biggest insurer, was bailed out by the US
Federal Reserve. The next day, the banking crisis spread to
the United Kingdom: Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) merged
with Lloyds TSB in an emergency rescue plan. On 29 Sep-
tember the Belgo-Dutch bank Fortis was bailed out by Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and the next day the
Belgo-French bank Dexia was bailed out by Belgium, France
and Luxembourg.
European Central Bank Eurogroup Presidency EU Presidency European Commission
EU member
states
OECD
Participates in Economic
and Development Review
Committee, Economic Pol-
icy Committee and Commit-
tee on Financial Markets
Participates in Economic
and Development Review
Committee examination
of the euro area
Quasi-membership (no
voting rights and does
not contribute to OECD
budget but participates in
all meetings)
19
IMF Executive Board Observer status
Euro area position repre-
sented by Executive Di-
rector holding EU/euro
area presidency
27
Financial Stability Forum Full participation 5
International Monetary
and Financial Committee
Observer status
Full participation depend-
ing on the constituency
agreement
Observer status 27
IMF Multilateral
Consultations
Full participation Full participation No Full participation
G7 Finance Ministers Nearly full attendance Nearly full attendance
Partial attendance (not
involved in preparatory
work)
4
G20 Full participation Full participation
Attends meetings as part
of the EU Presidency
delegation
5
Table 1: Representation of the euro area in various global forums5
The rapid rescue of Fortis and Dexia was hailed as a success
and led to the belief that the previously untested capacity of
euro-area governments to cooperate in times of crisis was
real. However, the mood changed rapidly. On 30 September,
the Irish government unilaterally guaranteed the safety of all
deposits, bonds and debts in Irish banks for the next two
years. On 3 October, the Dutch government nationalised the
Dutch activities of Fortis, forcing the Belgian government to
take over its Belgian activities. Rather
than continuing to cooperate and split-
ting the bill to maintain the Belgo-Dutch
bank, the two governments simply de-
cided to split the bank along national
lines. On 4 October, a meeting of the
heads of state of the four major euro-
area countries ended in empty words as Germany refused to
agree on a concerted bank rescue and stabilisation plan. Fi-
nally, on 5 October, the German government issued a unilat-
eral guarantee of all deposits in German banks. The weather
in the euro area had now definitely turned dark and stormy.    
For a while, it looked as if the EU, or even the euro area, was
unable to coordinate the response to the crisis. A group of
prominent economists rightly worried that: ‘The current ap-
proach of rescuing one institution after another with national
funds will lead to a Balkanisation of the European banking
sector. Agreeing a harmonised level for deposit insurance
would also be important’ (Alesina et al, 2008).  
At the Eurogroup and ECOFIN meetings on 6-7 October, fi-
nance ministers agreed that the economic situation ‘calls for
a coordinated response at the EU level’, but failed to adopt
anything beyond broad principles and did not even discuss
the rescue plan that the UK government would announce on
the following day. On 8 October, the ECB reduced its policy
rate by fifty basis points and changed its tender procedure,
moving to fixed-rate refinancing. However, this step failed to
impress money markets. At the end of the week, financial
markets throughout the world suffered one of their worst
days in history (“Black Friday”), which prompted the French
presidency of the EU to convene the first-ever meeting of the
heads of state and government of the euro area. This emer-
gency summit, held in Paris on 12 October, is viewed as the
turning point in the efforts to bring about a concerted Euro-
pean response to the financial crisis. 
The Paris summit was a success on many fronts. First, it sent
an important message to the markets. European govern-
ments abandoned the uncoordinated case-by-case approach
that had prevailed in favour of a series of national plans
based on a common template and pledged a total of nearly
€2 trillion to shore up their financial sectors, sparking sharp
rallies across the continent’s stock markets.
Second, the summit demonstrated that the euro area is not
only governed by the ECB but also by political leaders. The
message could not have been sent by the Eurogroup for two
reasons. First, finance ministers lack the public recognition
that heads of state and government enjoy. Moreover, despite
being his country’s prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, the
president of the Eurogroup, clearly lacks the kind of European
public recognition that President Sarkozy enjoys. Second, be-
cause the Eurogroup meets routinely and in the
drab building of the EU Council, it could not have
conveyed the sense of emergency and impor-
tance that was attached to the first meeting of
euro area leaders held in the Elysée Palace.    
Third, by inviting Prime Minister Gordon Brown to
the Paris meeting, President Sarkozy succeeded in building
a bridge between the euro area and not only the most im-
portant EU country outside the euro area, which was signi-
cant politically, but also with the area’s main financial centre,
which is equally important. Indeed, the financial crisis has
exposed a fundamental issue of economic governance of the
euro area. While members of the euro area clearly share com-
mon financial interests owing to the fact that they share a
common central bank, they also have common financial in-
terests with the other members of the EU, and the UK in par-
ticular, by virtue of the single market for financial services.
This fundamental issue also has implications for the UK,
since any remedy to the euro area’s financial governance
that did not include the UK – for instance a euro-area bank-
ing supervision mechanism – would risk jeopardising the role
of London as the euro area’s de factofinancial centre. 
Lastly, the show of unity among all EU leaders at the Euro-
pean Council meeting that was held a few days after the Paris
summit enabled the European Union to assume a role of
global leadership in the crisis at two levels. First, the United
States adjusted its banking rescue plan to make room for
capital injections, thereby bringing it closer to the European
template, itself based on the UK plan. Second, and more cru-
cially, immediately after the European Council meeting, Pres-
ident Sarkozy and Commission President Barroso flew to
Washington to meet with President Bush, carrying with them
the proposal, originally put forward by Gordon Brown and
adopted by the European Council, for a global summit to be
held before the end of 2008 to reform the world financial sys-
tem. The European proposal laid the foundation for the series
of G20 leaders’ summits on financial markets and the global
economy, the first held in Washington on 20 November,
2008, and the second in London on 2 April, 2009.
Despite the undeniable success of the Paris summit and the
decisions taken at the ensuing European Council meeting,
many problems have lingered Not only did a number of
‘Despite the Paris
Summit’s success, many
problems have lingered.’6
important policy issues remain unsolved, but an economic
crisis soon came on top of the financial one, bringing new
challenges to euro-area governance.
Several major policy issues still remain unsettled. The first
concerns the treatment of pan-European banks. After Fortis
and Dexia (whose bail-out by national governments was only
a first step and whose fate has not been settled at the time
of writing), a number of other banks with pan-European op-
erations needed to be rescued. Fortunately, however, none
of these institutions are quite as multinational in their
governance structure as Fortis was and Dexia remains. Their
bailouts were therefore purely national. Had a bank required
bailing out by several states (or if it were to require it in the
near-future), the lack of burden-sharing rules among Euro-
pean countries would inevitably have created a problem.
The second issue concerns the situation of
small countries with relatively large financial in-
stitutions. Clearly small countries have suffered
more than large countries. The bailouts in France
and Germany account for less than two percent
of each country’s GDP and, even in the UK, they
barely attain three percent. By contrast the bailouts repre-
sent around four percent percent of GDP for Ireland and Bel-
gium and six percent for the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
Austria, a small country whose banks are heavily exposed in
central and eastern Europe, has already committed some five
percent of GDP. Judging from spreads and credit default
swaps on government bonds, markets are already pricing the
risk that public finances in small countries like Austria or Ire-
land could pay a high price for rescuing their banking sec-
tors. With no common EU or euro-area coffer, some small
countries may have to rethink their financial sector strate-
gies and even question the very principle of specialising in
the provision of financial services.
The third issue is the situation in central and eastern Europe.
Until 15 September the countries in the region were hardly
affected by the crisis. There were difficulties in some coun-
tries but they were mostly national in character. However,
after the bankruptcy of Lehman all changed: interbank mar-
kets have been strained, there have been capital flow rever-
sals, several currencies have depreciated sharply, and the
recession has suddenly hit the region. Against this back-
ground, the euro area’s response has been slow. It first over-
looked the potential consequences of its decisions on
neighbouring countries – be they capital outflows in re-
sponse to the issuance of better guarantees in the western
part of Europe or credit curtailments in response to demands
made to banks to extend credit further in their home coun-
try. The euro area was then reluctant to formulate an overall
policy response, beyond the financial assistance provided to
countries under IMF programme. There was a fear of assum-
ing some form of responsibility for what were perceived as
national policy issues. These hesitations have tended to
overshadow the participation of the EU in IMF financial as-
sistance programmes in Hungary and Latvia. 
The fourth issue is the fragmentation of the single market.
Despite the common framework put in place to facilitate the
funding of banks, to provide financial institutions with addi-
tional capital resources and to allow the recapitalisation of
distressed banks, it appears that uneven implementation of
commonly agreed rules is the norm rather than the excep-
tion. Not a day goes by without a measure being taken by an
EU country that either seems to favour national financial in-
stitutions and/or requires these institutions to provide credit
to national customers.             
The fifth and final issue concerns the design
and implementation of a fiscal stimulus. While
governments were trying to respond to the
banking crisis, it became clear that it would
soon unleash an economic crisis that would
risk further aggravating the financial situation
and create a downward spiral resulting in economic depres-
sion. In order to avoid this eventuality, several voices on both
sides of the Atlantic came out in favour of a stimulus pack-
age. On both sides, there were natural concerns about fiscal
sustainability. 
Even among the vast majority who supported the idea of a fis-
cal stimulus, two additional issues were raised in Europe, both
relating to the absence of a euro area (or EU) federal state.
The first is the lack of a euro area fiscal instrument to support
economic activity, and the need to rely on national instru-
ments without being able to rely on an effective coordination
mechanism. The second is the fact that euro-area members
entered the crisis in very different fiscal shape, rendering the
decision to adopt national fiscal instruments all the more dif-
ficult. The European Recovery Programme put forward by
Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and von Weizsäcker in mid-November
2008 was precisely designed to counter these two issues. It
envisaged a harmonised indirect tax (VAT) cut in all EU coun-
tries, and the creation of a mechanism to ensure medium-
term fiscal sustainability in countries with unfavourable
starting conditions. 
The European Economic Recovery Plan proposed by the Eu-
ropean Commission a couple of weeks later also recognised
the difficulty of engineering a European fiscal stimulus with-
out proper European instruments and with diverse national
situations, but fell short of proposing the use of common
mechanisms. Instead, it simply called on EU member states
to adopt national measures. The Commission proposal was
‘Several major policy
issues still remain
unsettled.’7
4. See Pisani-Ferry et al(2008), p. 8.
5. The move in 2005 to a fixed presidency of the Eurogroup, instead of a rotating one, was intended to give it the means to take initiative and exercise-
leadership, but initiatives and leadership have been remarkably absent.
adopted by the December 2008 European Council and has
been implemented in various ways by EU members states.
However, by essentially ignoring the two issues flagged
above, the implementation of the European plan suffers from
two problems.
First, because countries have been allowed wide discretion in
the choice of fiscal instrument, many have adopted meas-
ures that tend to favour national producers at the expense of
foreign producers, thereby reintroducing barriers in the single
market. 
Second, because no new mechanism to ensure the sustain-
ability of public finances was introduced, a number of euro
area countries soon began suffering great difficulties. For
many years, markets seemed not to pay attention to differ-
ences in public finance conditions across euro-area coun-
tries. For instance, up to June 2007, the 10-year government
spread over German bonds was as low as 20 basis points for
Greece, despite a public debt of around 100 percent of GDP
and persistent deficits. One year later, in spite of the liquidity
crisis, its spread was still reasonably low at 60 basis points.
Since then, the crisis has left a heavy mark. Greek bond
spreads jumped to 150 basis points in October 2008 and
reached 250 points in early January 2009. Other euro area
countries whose spreads have dramatically increased since
October 2008 and were above 100 basis points at the begin-
ning of 2009 are Ireland (212 points), Italy (128 points),
Slovenia (126 points), Portugal (123 points) and Spain (109
points). As a result, several of these countries have already
seen their S&P ratings downgraded by one notch. In January
2009, Spain’s went down from AAA to AA+, Portugal from AA- to
A+, and Greece’s from A to A-, the lowest of any euro area coun-
try. This situation is worrisome because the euro area has nei-
ther a common funding scheme nor does it have a
well-specified mechanism to assist members facing a poten-
tial national funding problem.
4. Lessons
In their report on the euro’s first years, written and published
before the crisis developed, Pisani-Ferry et al(2008) warned
that: ‘A policy framework should not only be judged by its
agility in fair-weather conditions, but also by its resilience in
storm conditions – not only financial, but also economic and
political storms. In this respect, it should be recalled that the
last eight years have been benign. The policy framework of
the euro area has thus not yet been tested under stress. It
remains to be seen how well EMU is set up to deal with events
like disruptive global shocks or internal crises.’4
The experience since the start of the crisis confirms that the
euro area governance system was well equipped to deal with
normal conditions, even though there is need for improve-
ment in the scope, priorities and methods of surveillance,
but lacks the properties required to operate in crisis times as
enumerated in the first section, namely speed of reaction,
policy discretion and centralised action. At the centre of the
problem is the absence of a euro-area political body capable
of taking appropriate financial and fiscal decisions in diffi-
cult times. Ad-hoc coordination has indeed substituted in-
stitutional responses and this has been welcome. There are,
however, limits to what this type of coordination can achieve. 
The Eurogroup could, one day, evolve into such political body,
but it is far from there at the moment. For the time being the
Eurogroup is simply an informal body without a defined mis-
sion, whose role had developed in two directions prior to the
crisis: as an enforcer of EMU rules and as the venue for ad-
dressing the collective action problems faced by euro area
members. Although it was always better at the first task (be-
cause it could rely on treaty-based mechanisms for imple-
mentation), the latter task has simply been ignored since the
beginning of the crisis, despite the fact that it is precisely the
role that it should have assumed5.  Were it not for the October
2008 euro-area summit in Paris, the governance of the euro
area during the crisis would have been assumed by the ECB
alone, thereby underscoring the fact that the euro is not only
a currency without a state but even without political
governance.  
The governance of the euro area has been, since the launch
of the euro, the subject of difficult discussions between its
members, especially between France and Germany. Whether
or not the lessons from the crisis will be drawn by these
countries will largely depend on their ability to agree on a di-
agnosis of the problem and on remedies. 8
6. See Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2008)..
5. Conclusions
What are the implications of our analysis of euro-area
governance for the international role of the euro, both as a
regional and a global currency?
As already indicated, the euro had become a successful in-
ternational currency during the relatively calm years that
preceded the crisis. Even though it had not rivalled the dol-
lar’s world currency status, it had certainly become a strong
regional currency and it has been adopted as an anchor, as
a reference or as a vehicle for financial transactions in the
countries bordering the euro area. 
Is there reason to believe that the management of crisis so
far will dramatically alter this state of affair?
Our feeling is that the governance of the euro area in the cur-
rent stormy-weather conditions has not enhanced the inter-
national status of the euro.
Within the euro area, rising bond spreads and falling ratings
in some members, and the absence of a common funding
scheme and of a well-specified mechanism to assist those
facing funding problems, have done nothing to improve the
image of the euro with global investors. Although we regard
recent remarks on the possible exit or expulsion of those
members from the euro area as pure fantasy, we acknowl-
edge that the lack of clarity on how to resolve their debt prob-
lems is a source of worry.    
In the region, the treatment by the euro area of regional part-
ners which are currently facing severe economic and
financial difficulties and rely on the euro as their reference
currency has not been satisfactory either. Such partners in-
clude primarily new EU member states, but also countries
outside the EU, like Ukraine. These countries have typically
suffered from the drying up of capital flows from the euro
area and from the lack of assistance by euro area institu-
tions, including the ECB6.  Although this divide between coun-
tries inside and outside the euro area may accelerate the
adoption of the euro by some outsiders, the vast majority is
unlikely to join before the end of the crisis. In the meantime,
therefore, the weak crisis governance of the euro area is
likely to be a burden on these countries, which may affect
their choice of reference currency.         
In conclusion, the euro has proved to be attractive as a fair-
weather currency for countries and investors well beyond its
borders. But it still remains to be seen whether it is equipped
with a strong enough governance also to succeed as a
stormy-weather currency.   
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